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The Stock Market Reaction to Losing or Gaining Foreign Private Issuer Status 
 
  
Abstract 
 
The U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission designates foreign-domiciled firms with securities trading 
in the U.S. markets as either foreign private issuers (FPIs) or domestic filers and permits exemptions from 
U.S. domestic securities regulation for firms that qualify as FPIs. We study the stock market reaction to 
foreign-domiciled firms that lose or gain FPI status for an arguably exogenous reason while maintaining 
their cross-listing status. After loss of FPI status, foreign firms are required to comply with U.S. domestic 
issuers’ continuous filing requirements, such as filing quarterly financial statements using U.S. GAAP, 
disclosure of insider trading, and compliance with corporate governance requirements of U.S. domestic 
issuers. We document a significantly positive market reaction when foreign firms lose their exemptions 
and must comply with regulatory requirements of U.S. domestic issuers. Further, we find that the market 
reacts negatively to an increase in financial statement requirements and reacts positively to fully adopting 
U.S. corporate governance requirements.  
 
Keywords: Corporate governance, financial reporting, foreign private issuer, market reaction. 
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The Stock Market Reaction to Losing or Gaining Foreign Private Issuer Status 
 
1. Introduction 
In 1979,
1
 the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) adopted its current regulatory framework 
governing foreign-domiciled firms. The framework permits foreign-domiciled firms to follow regulatory 
and disclosure requirements that are less stringent than the requirements for U.S. domestic issuers, but 
typically more stringent than their home-country requirements. A significant literature examines the 
economic consequences of cross-listing in (and de-registering from) the U.S. and initiating (ceasing) 
compliance with the requirements of foreign private issuers. Less well understood is whether investors 
care about the exemptions granted to foreign private issuers (FPIs). Using a unique setting, we provide 
evidence about whether the U.S. stock markets value the disclosure and regulatory exemptions currently 
granted to FPIs.  
To study the costs and benefits of the two different levels of regulation for foreign-domiciled 
firms in the U.S., we exploit that some foreign-domiciled firms change FPI status over time, primarily 
due to events that are likely involuntary and outside managers’ direct control in the spirit of Gow et al. 
(2016). When foreign-domiciled firms lose their FPI status with the SEC, they continue their listing in the 
U.S. but become subject to the same, stricter regulatory requirements as U.S. domestic issuers. 
Conversely, when foreign-domiciled firms that are U.S. domestic filers with the SEC gain FPI status, they 
continue their U.S. listing but are permitted exemptions from certain regulatory requirements. Looking at 
foreign domiciled firms that lose or gain their FPI status with the SEC allows us to investigate some of 
the – possibly unintended – economic consequences of two-tiered reporting requirements. Moreover, we 
are able to document how the market perceives specific differences in requirements (e.g., financial 
statement disclosures vs. corporate governance). Identifying the specific consequences for firms that lose 
their FPI status informs regulators regarding which requirements the market views as beneficial versus 
costly. 
                                                 
1
 Adoption of Foreign Issuer Integrated Disclosure System, Exchange Act Release No. 16,371 (Nov. 29, 1979). 
 4 
Our setting provides an opportunity to test whether and how the U.S. stock markets value the 
exemptions from U.S. domestic reporting requirements because our sample firms remain cross-listed 
with their shares trading in the U.S. before and after their change in FPI status. Thus we can study the 
effect of switching to a different regulatory system while holding the country, enforcement, and 
shareholder protections more constant. The cost of this relatively clean test is that we sacrifice a larger 
sample size. 
Whether stock market value tends to increase when a firm moves from FPI disclosure and 
regulatory requirements to the requirements for U.S. domestic issuers is not obvious. Loss of FPI status 
results in increased disclosure and regulatory requirements. Shareholders may view increased 
requirements as value enhancing if greater transparency and stricter corporate governance limits 
managers’ and/or controlling shareholders’ ability to extract rents (e.g., Stulz 1999; Coffee 1999, 2002; 
Core et al. 2006; Berger and Hann 2007). In contrast, increased costs of compliance
2
 with additional 
standards may decrease firm value (e.g., Zhang 2007; Leuz et al. 2008; Li 2014). Law practitioners 
overwhelmingly focus on the benefit of maintaining FPI status to avoid the additional compliance costs of 
U.S. domestic issuers (e.g., Cohn and Vivero 2013). On the other hand, the exemptions may not be 
significant enough to affect firm value. In adopting the Foreign Issuer Integrated Disclosure System in 
1979, the SEC determined the requirements for FPIs were sufficient to protect U.S. investors. Frost and 
Kinney (1996) find similar correlations between earnings and stock returns for foreign-domiciled (FPIs) 
and U.S. domiciled issuers matched on size and industry, suggesting that foreign issuers’ lower 
disclosure levels may not, on average, impair the usefulness of earnings for valuing FPIs. 
To determine whether the stock market on balance views the change in reporting requirements as 
beneficial or costly, we examine the short-window stock market reaction to firms’ announcement of 
                                                 
2 For example, following its loss of FPI status, Alpha & Omega Semiconductor Limited reported in its Management 
Discussion & Analysis the following increase in costs, “In addition, we incurred $1.1 million of professional fees 
related to the conversion of our financial statements under IFRS to U.S. GAAP and a $0.9 million incremental 
expense associated with the requirements of being a public company.” These additional costs are not trivial as they 
represent 2.9% and 2.4% of the firm’s reported net income, respectively. 
 5 
change in FPI status.
3
 Specifically, we calculate the cumulative abnormal return (CAR) for the three-day 
period centered on the announcement of a change in FPI status. Our results are consistent with U.S. 
domestic reporting and regulatory requirements providing incremental value to shareholders above FPI 
requirements as we find a statistically significant 2.30% CAR for firms that lose their FPI status. We find 
a statistically insignificant negative CAR of -1.79% for firms that gained FPI status.  
In addition to examining the market’s overall reaction to a change in FPI status, we examine how 
the market reacts to exemptions FPIs receive from U.S. domestic regulatory requirements, which may 
differentially affect firm value. Specifically, we identify the exact requirements that changed within each 
firm, and classify them into three broad categories: Financial Statements, Disclosure of Insider 
Information, and Corporate Governance. The reporting requirements grouped in the Financial Statements 
category relate to the timeliness, quality and quantity of information disclosed in the financial statements. 
These requirements are costly to implement but likely provide more transparent reporting thereby 
reducing agency costs. A priori the effect on firm value is ambiguous. The reporting requirements 
grouped in the Disclosure of Insider Information category relate to the disclosure of inside information, 
such as insider ownership and sales as well as private disclosure of management information. The 
predicted effect of this category of requirements is unclear as theory indicates either positive or negative 
trading profits related to the disclosure of insider information (see Huddart et al. 2001, 2006). The last 
category of reporting requirements grouped in Corporate Governance relate to corporate governance. 
Theoretical and empirical evidence supports that stronger (weaker) corporate governance is associated 
with better (poorer) operating performance, which the market rewards with higher prices. An alternative 
view is that the optimal governance structure will vary from firm to firm (Baysinger and Butler 1985). 
                                                 
3
 A fundamental challenge for event studies in the cross-listing literature is that the market reaction to the U.S. cross-
listing announcement may signal positive news about firms’ growth prospects rather than for foreign firms’ bonding 
with U.S. laws and institutions. Our study is less likely to be affected by this issue for three reasons. First, FPI status 
changes for the majority of firms in our sample because of an increase or decrease in their U.S. investor base, which 
is outside the direct control of managers. Second, the announcement of a change in FPI status is unlikely to signal a 
change in firms’ growth prospects. If, for example, improvements in a firm’s U.S. growth prospects attract U.S. 
investors, which causes the change in FPI status, the information related to growth prospects should be incorporated 
in the firm’s stock price prior to the announcement of the change in FPI status. Third, we document that the change 
in the type and number of FPI requirements is associated with the market reaction to the announcement of the 
change in status.  
 6 
Thus, losing FPI status may force firms away from their optimal governance structure and negatively 
impact operating performance. 
Overall, our results suggest that shareholders view the extensive disclosure requirements relating 
to the Financial Statements category as costly while they find that Corporate Governance related 
requirements add value. Understanding how the stock markets value the various requirements may help 
U.S. regulators focus on the key differences. Our results add to a growing body of evidence that requiring 
FPIs to adopt the same corporate governance requirements as U.S. domestic issuers may benefit equity 
investors in the U.S. markets.
4
   
In additional analysis we mitigate concerns of test misspecification or omitted correlated bias. 
Specifically, in the spirit of Larcker et al. (2011), we perform Monte Carlo simulations which support 
that the change in FPI requirements is unrelated to daily returns in the absence of the announcement of 
a change in FPI status. Results are also robust to other factors that change in the short-window around 
the change in FPI status. 
We also examine individual FPI exemptions and document firms appear to suffer proprietary 
costs from the disclosure of segment information. In this analysis, we find some evidence that the 
disclosure of share ownership and sales is also viewed negatively by market participants. This finding 
seems generally consistent with the Huddart et al. (2006) who predict that mandated disclosure of 
insiders’ trades can allow multiple informed insiders to extract more information rents from other 
uninformed traders. Additionally, we confirm that the stock markets view increases in corporate 
governance standards of FPIs as value enhancing. Finally, we examine cross-sectional differences in 
firm size (Iliev 2010). Stock market reactions suggest that the financial statement compliance costs are 
more onerous for smaller firms than for larger firms. As competition increases among stock exchanges 
around the world to attract firms, differences in regulatory requirements can be an important factor. 
Our results are informative to regulators seeking to establish policies that are valued by market 
                                                 
4
 Foley et al. (2014) document that 80% of FPIs in the U.S. opt out of at least one U.S. corporate governance rule. 
When opting out, they generally opt to comply with weaker governance standards. They find this negatively affects 
the value of the firms’ cash holdings consistent with higher agency costs. 
 7 
participants.  
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes institutional details about FPIs, the 
potential effects of a change in FPI status, and our hypothesis development. Section 3 identifies the 
sample firms. Section 4 presents the results of market reaction surrounding a change in FPI status. 
Section 5 provides additional analyses. Section 6 concludes and offers suggestions for future research. 
2. Background and Hypothesis Development 
A FPI is an issuer that is incorporated or organized under the laws of a jurisdiction outside the U.S. A 
company maintains its status as a FPI unless it fails the ownership test and one of the three business 
contacts tests as defined in Rule 405 of the Securities Act of 1933, stated below: 
(1) Ownership Test: More than 50% of its outstanding voting securities are directly or 
indirectly owned by U.S. residents; and 
 
(2) Business Contacts Tests: Any of the following apply 
(a) The majority of its executive officers or directors are U.S. citizens or 
residents. 
(b) More than 50% of its assets are in located in the U.S. 
(c) Its business is administered principally in the U.S. 
 
Beginning as early as 1964, the SEC sought public comments regarding the appropriate 
reporting rules for these companies. Countervailing arguments in the debate include: 1) heightened 
regulation for the protection of investors and the need for equal reporting requirements for domestic 
and foreign issuers, and 2) promotion of public interest by encouraging foreign issuers to participate in 
highly regulated U.S. markets (Davidoff 2010). 
Over time, the SEC reached a balance between countervailing interests and adopted an integrated 
disclosure system for FPIs. In 1982 the SEC stated, “in developing the proposals the Commission sought 
to balance the policies of protecting investors by requiring substantially the same disclosure from 
domestic and foreign issuers and of promoting the public interest by encouraging foreign issuers to 
register their securities with the Commission” (SEC 1982). Thus, foreign-domiciled firms can enter the 
U.S. markets, list their securities as FPIs, and receive exemptions from some U.S. securities regulatory 
requirements applicable to domestic filers. As a result, not all firms listed in U.S. capital markets must 
 8 
comply with the same regulatory requirements.  
The relaxed disclosure and regulatory requirements encourage foreign firms to access the U.S. 
capital markets, but this may come at a cost to U.S. investors by impairing their ability to evaluate 
FPIs’ financial performance. Frost and Kinney (1996) address this question by examining the 
disclosures of a sample of 156 FPIs during 1989 and 1990 compared to U.S. firms matched on size and 
industry. They find that foreign issuers file fewer interim reports as well as file their earnings 
announcements, interim reports, and annual reports on a less timely basis than their U.S. matched 
firms. Among FPIs, they document differences in disclosures based on their filing status. Lastly, they 
document that foreign firm and U.S. firm earnings/stock returns correlations are similar and have 
similar significance levels for most country and disclosure partitions. Frost and Kinney (1996: 81) 
conclude that “the descriptive evidence on earnings/return associations for foreign issuers and the U.S. 
comparison firms suggests that foreign issuers’ lower disclosure levels may not, on average, impair the 
usefulness of earnings for valuing these firms.”  
Further, prior literature examines firms that enter U.S. markets. Cross-listing studies posit that 
foreign firms list shares in the U.S. to subject themselves to stricter regulatory requirements and 
enforcement, thereby attempting to separate themselves from other firms in their home market, which 
results in higher market valuations (Piotroski and Srinivasan 2008; Doidge et al. 2004). Other studies 
examine foreign firms that delist and/or deregister from U.S. exchanges and find mixed market reactions 
attributable to either differences in compliance costs or governance-related factors (Fernandes et al. 
2010; Marosi and Massoud 2008; Hostak et al. 2006; Witmer 2006). The cross-listing literature examines 
firms moving from home country regulatory requirements and institutions and adopting FPI requirements 
and bonding with U.S. institutions (e.g., legal environment). The event we study is distinct from this 
literature. We examine how the market perceives moving from FPI regulatory requirements to U.S. 
domestic regulatory requirements while holding constant the bonding with U.S. institutions because our 
sample firms are listed in the U.S. and subject to U.S. securities laws before and after the change in FPI 
status. Thus we can study the within-firm effect of switching to a different regulatory system while 
 9 
holding the country, enforcement, and shareholder protections constant.  
We identify firms that lose or gain FPI status and examine the market reaction to the 
announcement of the change in filing status. If U.S. domestic reporting requirements provide net 
benefits to shareholders relative to FPI reporting requirements, then we would expect a positive 
(negative) market reaction after losing (gaining) FPI status. On the other hand, Marosi and Massoud 
(2008) and Li (2014) find that some U.S. securities regulation of FPIs appears costly and excessive. 
U.S. law firms specializing in helping foreign firms access U.S. public markets tout the benefits of 
maintaining FPI status and describe losing FPI status as costly (Cohn and Vivero 2013). If the cost of 
complying with increased regulatory requirements exceeds the benefits, we would expect a negative 
(positive) market reaction upon losing (gaining) FPI status. Thus, whether and how the market values 
the exemptions from full U.S. domestic disclosure and regulatory compliance is an empirical 
question. As such we test the following null hypothesis:  
HYPOTHESIS 1. A change in regulatory requirements (FPI status) has no effect on firms’ market 
value.  
 
Another key innovation in our study is that we investigate how the market perceives the specific 
requirements that change when a firm gains or loses its FPI status. We identify specific differences in 
the reporting requirements between domestic and foreign filers, as summarized in Table 1. By examining 
the reporting requirements, we are relaxing the assumption of prior literature that all differences have the 
same directional impact.  
Insert Table 1 
The differences in reporting and regulatory requirements between domestic and foreign filers 
may be grouped in four broad categories: Financial Statements, Disclosure of Insider Information, 
Corporate Governance, and Initial Registration with the SEC. We discuss the requirements in each 
relevant category and the prior literature related to each requirement, except for Initial Registration with 
the SEC since all firms in our sample are already listed and trading in the U.S. Not all of these 
requirements affect each FPI since some FPIs’ home countries share the same requirements as the U.S. 
 10 
Thus we perform a detailed review of each firms’ filings and calculate the change in FPI requirements 
based on the actual number of requirements that changed for each firm. 
The reporting requirements grouped in the Financial Statements category relate to the 
timeliness, quality and quantity of information disclosed in the financial statements. We discuss each of 
the requirements in this category in the following paragraphs. 
FPIs are not required to meet accelerated filing requirements. Most domestic filers have 75 days 
from the end of their fiscal year to file their annual report, whereas FPIs are permitted six months.
5
 To 
the extent that shareholders view timely reporting as more beneficial than costly, we would expect 
markets to respond positively to the announcement that an FPI lost its status and must begin to meet 
accelerated filing requirements and file interim financial statements. 
FPIs may file non-U.S. GAAP financial statements. FPIs have for a long time been permitted to 
file financial statements prepared using accounting standards permitted by their home country or 
exchange with reconciliation to U.S. GAAP. For fiscal years ending after November 15, 2007, the SEC 
allowed FPIs that prepare financials statements in accordance with International Financial Reporting 
Standards (IFRS) to file with the SEC without reconciliations to U.S. GAAP (Gordon et al. 2012; 
Hansen et al. 2014). Regardless, foreign-domiciled issuers that lose FPI status, even those reporting 
under IFRS without reconciliation, must adopt U.S. GAAP. Wilford (2016) finds that foreign firms 
reporting under U.S. GAAP are more likely to report material weaknesses. Overall, a shift in GAAP 
could result in a change in the quality of reported financial information. 
Domestic issuers are required to make segment disclosures consistent with Statement of 
Financial Accounting Standard (SFAS) No. 131, Disclosures about Segments of an Enterprise and 
Related Information. Prior to fiscal years ending after December 15, 2009, FPIs had the option to omit 
segment data from their financial statements. Ettredge et al. (2005) evaluate the effect of firms’ 
                                                 
5
 FPIs typically file their financial statements with the U.S. SEC on either Form 20-F or, if Canadian, on Form 40-F. 
We collectively refer to annual financial statements as filed on Form 20-F. Beginning 12/15/2011, all FPIs must 
begin filing financial statements within four months of their fiscal year end. Bryant-Kutcher et al. (2013) and Doyle 
and Magilke (2013) provide evidence of a tradeoff between timeliness and reliability for U.S. domestic filers subject to 
shortened filing deadlines. 
 11 
adoption of SFAS 131 and find that segment disclosures increase the stock market’s ability to predict 
firms’ future earnings. Berger and Hann (2003) find that segment data prepared and presented under 
SFAS 131 affects market valuations. FPIs that previously omitted segment data would become required 
to initiate segment reporting upon losing FPI status. As a consequence, we predict that firms that lose 
(gain) FPI status experience improvement (deterioration) in their information environment. 
FPIs received an extension from full compliance with requirements of Sarbanes Oxley Act of 
2002 (SOX). In particular, the SEC extended the required date for the auditor’s attestation report on the 
company’s internal controls until the company files its first Form 20-F for a fiscal year ending on or 
after July 15, 2007. SOX could have changed the benefits of listing in the U.S. markets (e.g., Romano 
2005, Engel et al. 2007, Piotroski and Srinivasan 2008, and Bova et al. 2014). The expected benefits of a 
U.S. listing could increase due to the stricter governance requirements of SOX. Consistent with this, Li 
et al. (2008) document a positive relationship between SOX event returns and the extent of earnings 
management, consistent with the market expecting SOX to constrain firms’ earnings management. The 
benefits, similar to the legal bonding hypothesis (Stulz 1999; Coffee 1999, 2002), could increase 
(decrease) for firms that lose (gain) FPI status. On the other hand, to the extent that increased 
compliance costs outweigh additional benefits (e.g., Li 2014), we would expect the opposite results. 
Consistent with the latter argument, Bova et al. (2014) find reduced benefits from publicly-traded equity 
in the U.S. markets after SOX.  
The SEC changed the continuous disclosure requirement under the 1934 Exchange Act over 
time. While initially mandating annual financial statements, the SEC mandated semi-annual reporting in 
1955 and quarterly reporting in 1970. Currently, FPIs are exempt from quarterly reporting in the U.S. 
according to Rule 13a-13(b)(2) of the 1934 Exchange Act.
6
 Prior research examines the effects of 
reporting frequency. McNichols and Manegold (1983) examine the initiation of interim reporting and 
find that greater marginal information content of annual earnings reports when not preceded by quarterly 
                                                 
6
 FPIs that are required to report on a quarterly basis in their home country (e.g., Canada) must promptly file the 
same information with the SEC using a Form 6-K. 
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reports. Butler et al. (2007) find that firms that voluntarily increase reporting frequency experience an 
increase in the timeliness of earnings. Firms that lose FPI status become obligated to disclose interim 
reports, quarterly, which is higher frequency reporting than is typical outside of North America.  
Ex ante, the effects of the reporting requirements in Financial Statements on firm value are 
unclear. On one hand, the requirements likely provide more transparent reporting thereby reducing 
agency costs (e.g., Stulz 1999; Coffee 1999, 2002; Core et al. 2006; Berger and Hann 2007). On the 
other hand, the reporting requirements in Financial Statements increase compliance costs and may 
decrease firm value (e.g., Leuz et al. 2008; Li 2014). 
The reporting requirements grouped in the Disclosure of Insider Information category relate to 
the disclosure of inside information, such as insider ownership and sales as well as private disclosure of 
management information. FPIs are exempt from the disclosure of ownership percentages of major 
owners and sales of ownership under Section 16 of the 1934 Exchange Act. Currently, domestic 
companies are required to file initial statements of beneficial ownership as well as changes in beneficial 
ownership of executives and directors among others. Prior research documents evidence suggesting 
that managers backdate the grant date and exercise date of stock options (Lie 2005; Heron and Lie 
2007; Cicero 2009). This indicates that seemingly small regulatory changes can have material impact on 
inferences from data and, hence, enforcement. Firms that lose (gain) FPI status must disclose more 
(less) share ownership information, which could impact insider trading and firm value (Baiman and 
Verrecchia 1995, 1996; Huddart et al. 2001, 2006).  
Domestic issuers must comply with Regulation Fair Disclosure (FD) since 2000. Regulation 
FD provides that when an issuer discloses material nonpublic information to certain individuals or 
entities, the issuer must make public disclosure of that information (Heflin et al. 2012). In this way, the 
SEC aims to promote full and fair disclosure. Unless otherwise directed by their home country 
requirements, FPIs are not required to comply with Regulation FD and thus losing (gaining) FPI status 
results in more (less) widely disseminated disclosures.  
The predicted market reaction to reporting requirements grouped in the Disclosure of Insider 
 13 
Information category is also unclear. Huddart et al. (2001) predict lower expected trading profits to a 
single insider when disclosure of insider trades is mandatory. In contrast, Huddart et al. (2006) suggest 
that mandatory disclosure of insiders’ trading can work as a coordination mechanism yielding them with 
incentives to trade less aggressively resulting in higher expected profits to insiders when their trades are 
publicly disclosed. While their analytical settings and opposite predictions do not map directly into stock 
market reactions, it seems possible that the direction of the market reactions is not determinable ex ante. 
The last category of reporting requirements grouped in Corporate Governance relate to corporate 
governance. FPIs are exempt from the proxy rules and some of the corporate governance requirements 
applicable to domestic issuers.
7
 The NYSE and NASDAQ both grant substantial flexibility to FPIs by 
allowing them to follow their home country corporate governance practices rather than the stock 
exchange corporate governance requirements. The one exception for both exchanges is that they each 
require firms to have an audit committee composed solely of independent board members as set forth in 
Rule 10A-3 under the Exchange Act.
8
 The literature posits that weaker governance is likely associated 
with poor operating performance, which, in an efficient market, should be priced by investors (Core et al. 
2006). Gompers et al. (2003) document a positive association between corporate governance and firm 
value (Tobin’s Q) but fail to find that weaker governance is associated with poor performance. However, 
Core et al. (2006) and Bhagat and Bolton (2008) document a robust relationship between weak corporate 
governance and poor future operating performance. Thus, theoretical and some empirical evidence 
supports that stronger (weaker) corporate governance is associated with better (poorer) operating 
performance, which the stock market rewards with higher prices. Alternatively, Baysinger and Butler 
(1985) point out that the optimal governance structure will vary between firms. Thus, losing FPI status 
may force firms away from their optimal governance structure and negatively impact operating 
                                                 
7
 Becker et al. (2013) document the value of proxy rules showing that the market positively values increased 
shareholder access via the proxy process. 
8 Agrawal and Chadha (2005) document that firms with an independent director of the audit committee have a 
lower probability of restating their financial statements. 
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performance. How this affects foreign-domiciled firms that change FPI status depends on whether the 
changes in corporate governance practices between FPIs and domestic firms are valued by the market.  
Given that the directional impact of the regulatory requirements may be different across the 
groups, we test the following null hypothesis: 
HYPOTHESIS 2. The number of regulatory requirements that change in the categories Financial 
Statements, Disclosure of Insider Information, and Corporate Governance following a 
change in FPI status has no effect on firms’ market value. 
 
3. Sample 
Bloomfield et al. (2016) calls for researchers to gather new data. We respond by collecting a sample of 
firms and variables that can deepen our understanding of U.S. regulation of foreign-domiciled 
companies. Our initial sample consists of foreign-domiciled firms that lose or gain their FPI status 
between 2000 and 2015. We identify our sample through two sources. First, the SEC publishes annual 
lists of non-domestic registered and reporting companies.
9 
Using these annual lists, we identify foreign-
domiciled firms that either were at one time on the list and subsequently were removed (but remain 
trading in the U.S.) or foreign-domiciled firms trading in the U.S. that were not on the list, but were 
subsequently added. Second, since FPIs file annual financial statements on Form 20-F or Form 40-F,
10
 we 
download all Forms 20-F and Forms 40-F from the SEC’s Edgar system. We identified firms that filed a 
Form 20-F or Form 40-F and subsequently began filing a Form 10-K. Conversely, we identified firms 
that filed a Form 10-K and subsequently began filing either a Form 20-F or Form 40-F. Finally, we read 
through all SEC filings to verify proper identification of sample firms and also to identify the day the firm 
first announced a change in FPI status (See Appendix for an example). Results from following these two 
search procedures are presented in Table 2. We identify a total of 137 firms that lost their FPI status. 
From similar search procedures, we identify a total of 69 firms that gained FPI status. 
Insert Table 2 
As discussed previously, firms can lose or gain FPI status based upon meeting certain 
                                                 
9
 The SEC’s lists can be found at http://www.sec.gov/divisions/corpfin/internatl/companies.shtml 
10
 A FPI may also voluntarily file on Form 10-K; however, the FPI then has to meet all the reporting requirements of 
domestic filers. Thus a change in FPI status would not be associated with any change in its disclosures for this firm, 
which is the primary focus of our study. 
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conditions. To highlight the effect of the change in reporting requirements we exclude firm observations 
that are confounded by a separate fundamental change that could cause the change in FPI status. For 
example, a firm could lose its FPI status when the percentage of its shareholders [technically “holders of 
record”] that are U.S. citizens exceeds 50 percent. This could occur as a result of a FPI merging with a 
target firm whose shareholders are primarily U.S. citizens. To investigate this, we read through the 
financial statements for the year before and after the change in FPI status and identified firms that 
experienced a structural change (i.e., merger, acquisition, share offering, or bankruptcy) that could 
confound the effect of a change in reporting requirements. Thus, we eliminated 32 (31) firms that lost 
(gained) FPI status in conjunction with such a structural change in the entity. 
Next, some firms voluntarily complied with U.S. reporting standards despite meeting the 
qualifications of a FPI. To avoid concerns about firms’ incentives to self-select into a set of reporting 
standards we also removed the firms that voluntarily started or stopped reporting as a domestic filer. As 
such, we removed 38 (8) firms that lost (gained) FPI status. Finally, we were unable to obtain sufficient 
data to run our tests for 9 (7) firms that lost (gained) FPI status. Thus, our final sample contains 81 firms, 
58 firms that lost FPI status and became fully compliant with U.S. securities regulation and 23 firms that 
gained FPI status and discontinued meeting all reporting standards of domestic filers.
11
 
3.1 Why Firms’ FPI Status Changed 
 
As discussed previously, a foreign firm qualifies as a FPI if it passes either the Ownership test 
or Business Contacts test (i.e., the firm does not have U.S. ownership exceeding 50% or does not meet 
any of the three Business Contacts criteria). Failing one or both of those tests in a particular year could 
cause a loss of a foreign firm’s FPI status. For example, a FPI may have always failed the Business 
Contacts test (e.g., its business is principally administered in the U.S.), but passed the Ownership test 
until the U.S. share ownership surpassed the 50% threshold causing the firm to lose its FPI status. In 
contrast, U.S. share ownership may have always been greater than 50%, but the FPI firm passed all 
three criteria of the Business Contacts test. Then if the FPI firm failed one of the three Business 
                                                 
11
 No sample firms lost FPI status and then later regained FPI status or vice versa. 
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Contacts tests (e.g., because more than 50% of the firm’s assets were in the U.S.) the firm would lose 
its FPI status because it had always failed the Ownership test.
 
Finally, a FPI could have always passed 
both tests and then failed both tests in the same year. 
The distinction between these examples is important as changes in U.S. share ownership are not 
under the firm’s direct control and less likely reflect a strategic choice by the firm. In contrast, changes 
to the Business Contacts test are under the firm’s direct control and likely reflect a strategic choice by 
management. Firm management may attempt to bond to higher disclosure and governance standards as it 
may be associated with better performance, which the market rewards with higher prices (e.g., Doidge et 
al. 2004). However, increased standards may limit management’s ability to extract rents from outside 
shareholders. Thus, whether all firms would pool to the same set of standards when given the option to 
choose is not clear. We examine the SEC filings for each firm to identify the reason for the change in 
FPI status. In Table 2, Panel B we document that 64 (79%) of the 81 firms in our sample changed FPI 
status due to a shift in U.S. share ownership, consistent with the change in status being largely outside of 
the firm’s control. As such, we focus our discussion and analyses on these 64 firms. We present results 
for the full sample of 81, but note that the 17 firms that changed status due to the Business Contacts test 
may reflect strategic decisions that considered the effect on FPI status.  
3.2 Descriptive Statistics 
 
Table 1 documents the FPI exemptions from U.S. disclosure and regulation. Not all of these 
requirements affect each FPI since some FPIs’ home countries share the same requirements with the 
U.S. Further, some FPIs voluntarily comply with some of the disclosure and regulatory requirements 
for U.S. domestic registrants.
12
 As such, we examine each firm’s SEC filings to identify which of the 
first nine requirements detailed in Table 1 actually change when a firm changes FPI status.
13
 This 
makes our study unique in its ability to examine the impact of specific requirements.  
                                                 
12
 All but three countries (Australia, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom) in our sample permit the use of U.S. 
GAAP for firms cross-listed in the U.S.  
13
 We excluded the last two requirements since initial registration is not applicable to our sample of foreign firms 
already listed in the U.S.  
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Table 2, Panel C reports substantial changes related to the timeliness and quality of financial 
statements. Upon losing (gaining) FPI status, 59% of firms changed to (from) accelerated filing, 48% 
changed to (from) U.S. GAAP, 31% altered their segment disclosures, 22% initiate (cease) auditor’s 
attestation of internal controls, and 20% of firms change to (from) quarterly reporting. Changes to the 
disclosure of insider information related to share ownership and sales affected 42% of firms while 
Regulation FD affected 33% of firms. The majority of firms experienced changes related to corporate 
governance upon losing (gaining) FPI status: 73% began (terminated) compliance with proxy rules, and 
83% changed compliance with U.S. stock exchange governance standards. The changes in FPI 
requirements for the full sample are similar. 
In Table 3 Panel A, we document that 50% (65%) of the firms that lose (gain) FPI status are 
Canadian. This appears to be a fairly representative sample given that from 2000 to 2015, Canadian 
firms represented 41% of all FPIs, consistent with the geographic proximity and substantial integration 
between the U.S. and Canadian capital markets (Jackson 2006).
14
 While the capital markets in the U.S. 
and Canada share similarities as evidenced by the Multi-jurisdictional Disclosure System (MJDS),
15
 
substantial differences remain between the two countries that could cause the market to react when 
Canadian firms change FPI status.
16
 For example, Bhattacharya (2006) documents that Canada has 
fewer securities laws and laxer enforcement of these laws than the U.S., particularly related to insider 
trading. Morck and Yeung (2006) and Halpern and Puri (2007) document differences in corporate 
governance and ownership structures that cause valuations of Canadian public companies to be 
significantly lower than those found in the U.S. Even between accounting standards, U.S. GAAP is 
generally perceived as more costly to implement than Canadian GAAP (AcSB 2011), more rules-
oriented, and more detailed than both IFRS and Canadian GAAP.  
In Table 3, Panel B, we display the distribution of the sample firms across U.S. stock 
                                                 
14
 In 2013, 51% of foreign direct investment in Canada was from the U.S. (Statistics Canada: 
http://www.statcan.gc.ca/daily-quotidien/140425/t140425a001-eng.htm). 
15
 Adopted in 1991, the MJDS permits Canadian (U.S.) issuers to access U.S. (Canadian) capital markets using 
prospectuses prepared in accordance with Canadian (U.S.) disclosures. 
16 
See Section 5.3 for further discussion. 
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exchanges noting that 43% of firms that lost FPI status list on the NASDAQ while 65% of the firms 
that gain FPI status list on an Over the Counter (OTC) market. Event-date clustering can be 
problematic for the event study methodology (Bernard 1987; Schipper and Thompson 1983). Table 3, 
Panel C indicates that this is unlikely a concern in our setting as events do not cluster by year within the 
sample.
17
  
Insert Table 3 
A change in FPI status can affect firms differently. Thus, we create a variable labeled FPI 
Score, which is the number of requirements from Table 1 (excluding the two requirements related to 
initial registration with the SEC) with which a firm complies. ΔFPI Score is FPI Score after the change 
in FPI status less FPI Score before the change in FPI status and is positive (negative) for firms that lose 
(gain) FPI status. In Table 3, Panel D we document that firms that lose (gain) FPI status on average 
change 4.0 (-4.4) of the exemptions in regulatory requirements.  
The FPI exemptions relate to three main categories: financial statements, disclosure of insider 
information, and corporate governance. Accordingly, we also create three variables that count firms’ 
compliance with the requirements in these three areas before and after the change in FPI status. We 
then calculate the change (Δ) in each of these areas as the score after the change in FPI status less the 
score before the change in FPI status. Financial Statements relates to the timeliness, quality, and 
quantity of information disclosed in financial statements. It is calculated as the number of the following 
five requirements that a firm complies with: Accelerated Filing, U.S. GAAP, Segment Disclosure, 
Auditor’s Attestation on Internal Controls, and Quarterly Filings. Disclosure of Insider Information 
relates to information on insiders ownership and sales as well as selective disclosure of material inside 
information. This is calculated as the number of the following two requirements that a firm complies 
with: Disclosure of Insider Ownership and Sales and Regulation FD. Lastly, Corporate Governance is 
calculated as the number of the following two requirements that a firm complies with: Proxy Rules and 
                                                 
17
 Fernandes et al. 2010 examine the 2007 SEC Rule 12h-6, which makes it easier for foreign firms to deregister 
with the SEC. Rule 12h-6 does not appear to impact the sample firms, as we do not identify any clustering in the 
number firms that lose/gain FPI status after its passage. 
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U.S. Stock Exchange Corporate Governance. As with ΔFPI Score, ΔFinancial Statements, ΔDisclosure 
of Insider Information, and ΔCorporate Governance are positive (negative) for firms that lose (gain) 
FPI status. Table 3, Panel D details that the average score for ΔFinancial Statements, ΔDisclosure of 
Insider Information, and ΔCorporate Governance for firms that lose FPI status is 1.7, 0.8, and 1.5, 
respectively, and for firms that gain FPI status is -2.1, -0.6, and -1.7, respectively. 
Table 3, Panel D also indicates that firms that lose FPI status are larger as evidenced by 
average total assets of $1,104.4 million compared to $52.1 million for firms that gain FPI status.  
4. Results 
We calculate the cumulative abnormal return (CAR) for the three-day period centered on the 
announcement of a change in FPI status. As is standard, we calculate expected returns using the market 
model estimated for 260 trading days to 10 trading days before each firm’s announcement of a change in 
FPI status. We end the estimation period 10 days prior to the event to prevent contamination of the event 
window. We use the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) value-weighted return to proxy for 
the market return. The daily abnormal return is calculated as the firm’s daily return less the expected daily 
return estimated using the market model. The CAR is the sum of the daily abnormal returns for the three-
day period centered on the announcement of a change in FPI status. In Tables 4 – 7, we present results for 
the sample of firms that change FPI status due to passing (failing) the Ownership Test because less than 
(more than) 50% of the firm’s shares are owned by U.S. residents and for the full sample. Since share 
ownership by U.S. residents is not under the direct control of the firm and the change in FPI status for 
these firms is more likely an exogenous event, we focus our discussion of the results for this sample. 
Our results in Table 4 are consistent with U.S. domestic issuer requirements providing value to 
shareholders relative to FPI requirements. We document a positive and significant CAR when firms 
announce a loss of FPI status. For firms that announce gaining FPI status, the sign of the mean and 
median cumulative abnormal return is negative, but not statistically significant. The lack of statistical 
significance may be due to the small sample size of 20 firms. The results are similar for the full sample. 
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Overall, Table 4 provides some evidence to reject the null in hypothesis 1 that the change in FPI status 
has no effect on firms’ market values. 
Insert Table 4 
Next we investigate whether the effect on firm value varies with the type of change in 
requirements for the three broad categories (Financial Statements, Disclosure of Insider Information, and 
Corporate Governance) of regulatory differences between FPIs and domestic issuers. In column 1 of 
Table 5 Panel A, we report the regression of cumulative abnormal returns on the changes in these three 
broad categories for the ownership sample. The results indicate that the market views the changes related 
to Financial Statements as costly and the changes to Corporate Governance as value enhancing. 
Specifically, the coefficient on ΔFinancial Statements is -0.013 and statistically significant (p-value 
0.045). This finding is consistent with the market viewing the costs of these requirements as exceeding 
their benefits. The coefficient on ΔDisclosure of Insider Information is not statistically significant, which 
is not surprising given the conflicting theories surrounding the disclosure of insider trading. The 
coefficient on ΔCorporate Governance is 0.022 and statistically significant (p-value 0.016), which is 
consistent with the market viewing these changes as improving the governance of the firm. Accordingly, 
we reject the null in hypothesis 2. This result is important because it provides evidence that the change in 
the type of requirements is associated with the market’s reaction to changes in FPI status, which reduces 
concerns that we may be picking up spurious correlations. This result should be of interest to regulators as 
they contemplate the appropriate disclosure and corporate governance requirements for FPIs and U.S. 
domestic issuers. Specifically, our results suggest that requiring all FPIs to adopt the corporate 
governance requirements of U.S. domestic issuers may benefit U.S. investors.  
In the second and third columns, we examine the firms that lost and gained FPI status separately 
instead of pooling them together. We note that for the firms that lost FPI status, the magnitude of the 
coefficients on ΔFinancial Statements (-0.014) and ΔCorporate Governance (0.024) is similar to the 
pooled results in column 1 and both remain statistically significant. For firms that gained FPI status we 
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fail to note any statistical significance. While this could be due to the reduced sample size of 20 firms that 
gained FPI status, results appear concentrated among firms that lost FPI status. 
Insert Table 5 
5. Additional Analyses 
5.1 Monte Carlo Simulation 
We perform Monte Carlo simulation to mitigate two possible concerns. First, our findings 
might result from test misspecification or an omitted correlated determinant of the cross-section of 
returns. Our tests are predicated on the assumption that, absent the announcement of the change in FPI 
status, daily stock returns are unrelated to the change in FPI requirement variables. If this is not the 
case, then we would expect our change in FPI requirement variables to be related to daily returns even 
in the absence of the announcement of a change in FPI status and that the sign of the relation between 
change in FPI requirements and daily returns would be the same on non-announcement days. Second, 
our prior tests rely on asymptotic normality. Monte Carlo simulations relax this assumption. 
We address these concerns by performing a Monte Carlo analysis using the same approach as 
Larcker et al. (2011). Specifically, we simulate our results under the null hypothesis that the 
announcement dates of firms’ changes in FPI status are unrelated to disclosure and corporate 
governance changes. For each firm, we randomly select one non-announcement day from the year 
preceding the announcement date of a firm’s change in FPI status and regress the three-day cumulative 
abnormal return centered on the randomly chosen non-announcement day on the categories of the 
change in FPI Score (ΔFinancial Statements, ΔDisclosure of Insider Information, and ΔCorporate 
Governance). We repeat this step one thousand times retaining coefficient estimates for each iteration. 
We then test whether the coefficient estimates from Table 5 are different from the average of the non-
announcement day coefficients using the empirical distribution of the one thousand non-announcement 
coefficient estimates (instead of testing if the coefficient estimates are different from zero as in Table 
5).  
Essentially, this test is a difference-in-difference estimator that assesses whether the cumulative 
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abnormal return on the announcement date of firms’ announcements of change in FPI status varies 
cross-sectionally with the change in the type of FPI requirements, and whether the variation is 
significantly different between announcement and non-announcement dates. Comparing results from 
announcement and non-announcement days controls for any temporally constant relationship between 
cumulative abnormal returns and the variables of interest, and rules out that what we document is a 
general phenomenon not related to the change in FPI requirements.  
The results of the Monte Carlo simulations are presented in Table 6. Our findings from the 
Monte Carlo analysis are consistent with those reported in Table 5. For the ownership sample, the 
average of the coefficient estimates for ΔFinancial Statements, ΔDisclosure of Insider Information, 
and ΔCorporate Governance are nearly zero and significantly different from the event-day coefficients 
on ΔFinancial Statements and ΔCorporate Governance. Thus, our inferences are similar whether we 
test if coefficients are different from zero (Table 5) or different from the average of non-event 
coefficients (Table 6). This helps minimize concerns about test misspecification and omitted 
determinants of the cross-section returns. Additionally, in columns 2 and 3 we find that results are 
concentrated among firms that lose FPI status. 
Insert Table 6 
The cumulative evidence of the relation between the cumulative abnormal returns and the 
change in the type of FPI requirements suggests the market is reacting to the change in FPI 
requirements, and is not the result of test misspecification or an omitted determinant of the cross-
section of returns. First, the events in our setting are not clustered in time and are arguably exogenous 
(i.e., due to ownership changes). Second, the correlation between the type and number of changes in 
FPI requirements further suggests the market is reacting to the effects of the change in FPI status. 
Third, the Monte Carlo analysis rules out that the market reaction is due to a general phenomenon 
instead of the effects of the change in FPI status. Lastly, the short-window analysis centered on the 
announcement of the change FPI status further strengthens our confidence that our results are due to 
the change in FPI disclosure and regulatory requirements and not due to correlated changes in firm 
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characteristics that lead to a change in the level of U.S. ownership. If changes in firm characteristics 
lead U.S. investors to purchase more shares, which then leads to a change in FPI status, that 
information would be reflected in firms’ market values prior to the announcement of the change in FPI 
status.  
5.2 Individual Exemptions 
By identifying specific reporting requirements that change when a firm gains or loses its FPI 
status we can investigate how the market perceives the specific requirements. For example, we can 
evaluate whether the negative association between ΔFinancial Statements and stock returns is due to a 
single or multiple reporting requirements. In Table 7 we document a negative and significant coefficient 
on ΔSegment Disclosure (-0.029, p-value 0.091), consistent with proprietary costs associated with 
disclosing segment information. Additionally, we note a negative association between ΔDisclosure of 
Share Ownership and Sales and stock returns (-0.033, p-value 0.033). This finding seems generally 
consistent with Huddart et al. (2006) who predict that mandated disclosure of traders can allow multiple 
informed insiders to extract more information rents from other uninformed traders. However, we note 
that this result should be interpreted with caution since the coefficient on ΔDisclosure of Insider 
Information is insignificant in Table 5. Results in Table 7 confirm that the market views increases in 
corporate governance standards of FPIs as value enhancing as ΔU.S. Stock Exchange Corporate 
Governance is positive and significant (0.064, p-value 0.005). We document similar results from the full 
sample in column 2. Additionally, consistent with prior literature (Bryant-Kutcher et al. 2013; Doyle and 
Magilke 2013) results suggest there is a cost-benefit trade-off between the timeliness and/or the quality 
of reporting as ΔAccelerated Filing is negative and significant (-0.032, p-value 0.089). This result is also 
consistent with increased direct costs (e.g. audit fees) associated with meeting accelerated filing 
deadlines. Finally, we note a positive and significant (0.041, p-value 0.051) association between the 
initiation of an internal control audit and market value, suggesting investors value improved corporate 
governance (Farber 2005). Again, we caution interpretation of the results on ΔAccelerated Filing and 
ΔAuditor’s Attestation on Internal Controls as the coefficients estimates are only significant in the full 
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sample. 
5.3 Canadian Firms 
 Over 50 percent of our sample firms are headquartered in Canada which could impact the 
generalizability of results to other countries if our results are concentrated within the subsample of 
Canadian or non-Canadian firms. As such, we segregate Canadian and non-Canadian firms and find 
that both experience statistically significant positive abnormal returns upon losing FPI status. 
Additionally, firms that gain FPI status experience insignificant negative abnormal returns in both 
subsamples. Results for both sets of firms are similar to those presented in Table 4.  
Next, we examined whether the number of changes in FPI requirements and the categories of 
changes in FPI requirements for Canadian firms and non-Canadian firms is similar and found no 
statistical differences in the overall number of changes nor in the changes at the category level. Finally, 
we repeated the regression analysis from Table 5 for the two subsamples. While we fail to identify any 
statistical significance on the variables of interest in either regression, the direction and magnitude of 
the coefficients on ΔFinancial Statements, ΔDisclosure of Insider Information, and ΔCorporate 
Governance are similar across the subsamples. Failure to reject the null is likely due to the small 
sample sizes of 35 Canadian and 29 non-Canadian firms. While making broad conclusions with a 
small sample is challenging, non-Canadian firms do not appear to solely drive the cross-sectional 
differences in the change in FPI requirements.  
5.4 Firm Size 
 Compliance with the more stringent U.S. requirements for financial statements may have a 
fixed cost component that makes compliance relatively more burdensome for smaller firms. Similarly, 
smaller firms may benefit more from governance requirements they would not otherwise meet. As 
such, we created an indicator variable equal to one if the firm is below the median size, and zero 
otherwise. We then interacted this indicator variable with ΔFinancial Statements, ΔDisclosure of 
Insider Information, and ΔCorporate Governance. In untabulated analysis, we find the main effect of 
ΔFinancial Statements, and ΔCorporate Governance remains consistent with prior analysis. Further, 
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we find an incremental negative market reaction for small firms complying with the financial 
statement requirements, i.e., the coefficient on the interaction of the indicator variable and ΔFinancial 
Statements is negative and statistically significant. Results are consistent with Iliev (2010) who finds 
that increased regulatory requirements imposed by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 were particularly 
onerous to smaller firms.  
5.5 Legal Environment 
In Morrison v. National Australia Bank, the U.S. Supreme Court affirmed that Section 10(b) 
claims do not apply extraterritorially (Cohn and Vivero, 2013). Thus, after the 2010 Supreme Court 
ruling, the legal environment may have changed for foreign-domiciled issuers.  
Of the 64 firms in our sample, 17 changed FPI status after the 2010 ruling. To investigate whether 
our overall results are driven by a change in the legal environment for these 17 firms, we performed the 
same regression analysis contained in Table 5. However, we included a dichotomous variable equal to 
one for observations after the 2010 ruling and an interaction term with the changes in the components of 
FPI Score. Untabulated results are consistent with those reported in Table 5. Further, we found no 
statistically significant results for the dichotomous variable nor the interaction terms. While results appear 
consistent with the changes in reporting requirements causing the market reaction and not any change in 
the legal environment, we caution readers to interpret with caution due to the small sample size of firms 
that change status after the Morrison ruling. 
5.6 Influential Observations 
 We examine whether influential observations may be driving our results by examining Cook’s D, 
a common measure of the influence of an observation in ordinary least squares regression (Cook 1979). 
As is standard, observations with a Cook’s D of more than 4/n are considered influential. We identified 
four observations with Cook’s D values greater than 4/64 in our sample. After deleting these 
observations, we find similar coefficient estimates and even stronger statistical significance. As such, our 
results do not appear to be attributed to influential observations. 
5.7 Concurrent Events 
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As described in Section 3, we removed firms that had a significant acquisition or share offering. 
However, it is possible that other correlated events or changes in firm characteristics occurred in the same 
period as the change in FPI status. We address this concern in three ways. First, we control for short-term 
events leading up to the change in FPI status by estimating abnormal returns using the four-factor model 
that accounts for momentum (Fama and French 1993; Carhart 1997) and find that results are 
quantitatively and qualitatively similar. Second, in Section 5.1 we performed Monte Carlo analyses by 
selecting a one-year period preceding the event date to address characteristics of the firms that are 
constant over time. Alternatively, using a smaller window controls for concurrent events that may be 
correlated with stock returns. As such, we re-performed the Monte Carlo analysis from Section 5.1 by 
limiting the non-announcement window to just the one month prior to the change in FPI status. Results of 
this additional Monte Carlo analysis are unchanged, providing additional support that other current events 
are not impacting results. Third, to investigate the robustness of our results to significant open market 
share purchases by a small number of institutional investors, we collected institutional ownership from 
Form 13f filings in the quarter prior to and after a change in FPI status.
18
 Next, we estimated results in 
Table 5 after removing eight firms that had a greater than five percent change in the institutional 
ownership during the quarter preceding the change in FPI status. Results and interpretations are 
quantitatively and qualitatively similar.
19
  
Despite results of this sensitivity analysis, lack of detail in firm disclosures prevent definitive 
conclusions regarding the cause of the change in FPI status. After examining firms’ disclosures both in 
SEC filings and the popular press, we conclude that the overwhelming majority of firms do not disclose 
the reason for a change in ownership percentage. Further, firms omit the actual foreign ownership 
percentages surrounding the change, merely disclosing they have crossed the 50 percent threshold. Thus, 
while results are robust to changes in institutional ownership, we are unable to examine whether the 
change is due to large purchases/sales from a small number of non-institutional investors or whether the 
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 The mean change in the percentage of shares held by institutional investors was a statistically insignificant 
increase of less than one percent. 
19
 We thank a reviewer for these suggestions. 
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firm was already very close to the 50 percent threshold.  
6. Conclusion and Future Work 
Countervailing arguments in the debate over foreign-domiciled firms include a heightened regulation 
for the protection of investors and a promotion of public interest by encouraging foreign issuers to 
participate in highly regulated U.S. markets (Davidoff 2010). Over time, the SEC has adopted an 
integrated disclosure system for FPIs. Thus, foreign firms designated as FPIs can enter the U.S. markets 
and list securities without complying with the U.S. SEC requirements of domestic firms. Exemptions 
from U.S. domestic reporting relate to the timeliness, quality, and access to financial information as 
well as corporate governance practices. We study the market reaction of foreign firms losing or gaining 
foreign private issuer status. When foreign firms lose their FPI status, and therefore must commence 
full compliance equivalent to U.S. domestic issuers, the foreign firms experience a statistically 
significant positive cumulative abnormal stock return over the three-day window beginning one day 
before the announcement. We further document how this stock market reaction relates to both the type 
and number of regulatory requirements that change. Specifically, we find that the stock market reacts 
negatively to the financial statement requirements and positively to the corporate governance 
requirements.  
 Results could have important policy implications for regulators, particularly with respect to 
corporate governance requirements. Given that 80% of FPIs in the U.S. opt out of at least one U.S. 
corporate governance rule (Foley et al. 2014), a significant gap exists between FPIs and domestic filers. 
Differences in governance standards may be concerning to potential investors of foreign-domiciled 
firms. The increased value from governance standards appears to overcome any decrease in value 
associated with increased costs to comply with other disclosure requirements as the overall CAR is 
positive (negative) for firms losing (gaining) FPI status. Results suggest regulators might consider 
removing any corporate governance exemptions for foreign-domiciled firms.  
Future work might investigate how the U.S. cross-listing premium is associated with foreign-
domiciled firms that enter the U.S. markets and list their securities as FPIs versus foreign-domiciled firms 
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that fully comply with all U.S. securities regulation applicable to domestic firms. The literature on the 
U.S. cross-listing premium (e.g., Doidge et al. 2004) posits several sources of the premium including, a 
lower risk premium from more efficient risk-sharing (Foerster and Karolyi 1999), easier access to capital 
at a lower cost (Lins et al. 2003), more extensive, high quality disclosure than listing in the firm’s home 
country (Coffee 2002), and better shareholders’ protection through greater scrutiny and monitoring (Stulz 
1999; Coffee 1999, 2002). Partitioning by whether foreign-domiciled firms cross-list as FPIs or full 
compliance with all U.S. domestic issuers’ requirements may yield additional insights for this literature.  
 
Acknowledgements 
 
We thank conference participants at 2015 AAA FARS Meeting, 2014 AAA International Midyear 
Doctoral Consortium, BYU Accounting Research Symposium, Hong Kong Polytechnic University, and 
workshop participants at California Polytechnic State University, San Luis Obispo, University of 
Alabama and University of Colorado at Boulder, as well as Vishal Baloria (discussant), Jonathan 
Bonham, Joshua Cutler, Grace Pownall, Mahdi Rastad, Steve Rock, Mary Stone, Linda Vincent, and 
Brady Williams for helpful comments. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 29 
Appendix  
 
Example of change in FPI status disclosure 
 
Invesco PLC lost FPI status in 2007. They described some of the disclosure requirement changes that 
firms face upon losing FPI status on Form 8-K dated July 18, 2007 as follows:  
 
“On July 18, 2007, the company determined that it no longer satisfied the definition of “foreign 
private issuer” under the rules and regulations of the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission 
(“SEC”). In consequence, the company has begun filing Current Reports on Form 8-K and will 
commence filing Quarterly Reports on Form 10-Q (beginning with the period ending 
September 30, 2007) and Annual Reports on Form 10-K (beginning with the annual report for 
fiscal year 2007), as well as proxy statements with respect to meetings of shareholders, with the 
SEC as if it were a fully domestic U.S. company. On July 18, 2007, the company issued a press 
release with respect to the above.”  
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Requirements of U.S. registrants and FPIs.
Requirement U.S. registrant FPI
Financial Statements
Accelerated Filing Yes No
U.S. GAAP Yes No
Segment Disclosure Yes No
Auditor's Attestation on Internal Controls (prior to 2007) Yes No
Quarterly Filings Yes No
Disclosure of Insider Information
Disclosure of Share Ownership and Sales Yes No
Regulation FD Yes No
Corporate Governance
Proxy Rules Yes No
U.S. Stock Exchange Corporate Governance Yes No*
Initial Registration with the SEC
Direct Registration Program (Sec 17A, '34 Act) Yes No
Confidential First Time Registration Statements No Yes
Table 1
*Exception: Both the NYSE and NASDAQ permit FPIs substantial flexibility to follow their home country corporate 
governance practices provided that the FPI discloses any differences in corporate governance practices from those 
followed by U.S. domestic companies and that the FPI follows the Audit Committee requirements of Rule 10A-3 
under the Exchange Act, which includes the requirement that each audit committee member be an independent 
member of the board of directors. 
Notes: The table details the regulatory requirements that are different between U.S. domestic firms 
and FPI status firms.
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Sample formation.
Lose FPI 
status
Gain FPI 
status
Firms identified from SEC lists and filings 137 69
Firms with fundamental change (e.g., merger) (32) (31)
Firms voluntarily complying with U.S. reporting requirements (38) (8)
Firms without sufficient data (9) (7)
58 23
FPI test Frequency Percentage
Panel B: Why firms' FPI status changed
Ownership Test 64 79%
Business Contacts Test 17 21%
81 100%
Specific Business Contacts that change:
Executives/directors 6 35%
U.S. assets 7 41%
Business administered in U.S. 4 24%
17 100%
Requirement Frequency Percentage Frequency Percentage
Panel C: Frequency of specific requirements that change with the FPI status change
Financial Statements
Accelerated Filing 38 59% 52 63%
U.S. GAAP 31 48% 39 48%
Segment Disclosure 20 31% 22 27%
Auditor's Attestation on Internal Controls (prior to 2007) 14 22% 16 20%
Quarterly Filings 13 20% 16 20%
Disclosure of Insider Information
Disclosure of Share Ownership and Sales 27 42% 36 44%
Regulation FD 21 33% 28 34%
Corporate Governance
Proxy Rules 47 73% 61 74%
U.S. Stock Exchange Corporate Governance 53 83% 70 85%
Table 2
Notes: The table reports the formation of the sample of firms that change FPI status (Panel A), why firms' FPI status 
changed (Panel B), and which specific requirements actually change following a change in FPI status (Panel C). We 
removed firms that changed their FPI status due to fundamental changes, which we defined as a merger, acquisition, major 
share offering, or bankruptcy. Additionally, we removed firms that were technically FPIs, but voluntarily filing under full 
U.S. reporting requirements, that voluntarily chose to switch to FPI reporting using a 20-F or 40-F. 
Full sample (N=81)Ownership sample (N=64)
Panel A: Sample formation
 
  
Sample description.
Country Frequency Percentage Frequency Percentage Frequency Percentage Frequency Percentage
Panel A: Countries
Antigua 0 0% 1 5% 0 0% 1 4%
Australia 2 5% 0 0% 2 3% 0 0%
Bermuda 5 11% 0 0% 5 9% 0 0%
British Virgin Islands 3 7% 1 5% 3 5% 2 9%
Canada 22 50% 13 65% 31 53% 13 57%
Cayman Islands 2 5% 2 10% 2 3% 2 9%
Ireland 1 2% 0 0% 2 3% 0 0%
Israel 2 5% 2 10% 4 7% 3 13%
Liberia 1 2% 0 0% 1 2% 0 0%
Marshall Islands 1 2% 0 0% 1 2% 1 4%
Neth. Antilles 1 2% 0 0% 1 2% 0 0%
New Zealand 0 0% 1 5% 0 0% 1 4%
Panama 0 0% 0 0% 1 2% 0 0%
Switzerland 1 2% 0 0% 1 2% 0 0%
United Kingdom 3 7% 0 0% 4 7% 0 0%
44 100% 20 100% 58 100% 23 100%
U.S. stock exchange Frequency Percentage Frequency Percentage Frequency Percentage Frequency Percentage
Panel B: U.S. stock exchanges
AMEX 4 9% 2 10% 5 9% 2 9%
NASDAQ 19 43% 4 20% 26 45% 6 26%
NYSE 14 32% 1 5% 18 31% 1 4%
OTC 7 16% 13 65% 9 16% 14 61%
44 100% 20 100% 58 100% 23 100%
(The table is continued on the next page.)
Full sample
Table 3
Lose FPI status Gain FPI status
Lose FPI status Gain FPI status
Ownership sample
Lose FPI status Gain FPI status
Ownership sample Full sample
Lose FPI status Gain FPI status
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Year Frequency Percentage Frequency Percentage Frequency Percentage Frequency Percentage
Panel C: Announcement year of change in FPI status
1999 1 2% 1 5% 1 2% 1 4%
2000 5 12% 1 5% 6 10% 1 4%
2001 0 0% 0 0% 2 3% 0 0%
2002 2 5% 1 5% 3 5% 1 4%
2003 2 5% 3 15% 3 5% 3 13%
2004 3 7% 3 15% 3 5% 3 13%
2005 3 7% 3 15% 4 7% 3 13%
2006 4 9% 1 5% 5 9% 2 9%
2007 3 7% 2 10% 4 7% 2 9%
2008 3 7% 3 15% 4 7% 4 19%
2009 3 7% 0 0% 3 5% 1 4%
2010 2 5% 0 0% 2 3% 0 0%
2011 4 9% 0 0% 4 7% 0 0%
2012 1 2% 1 5% 2 3% 1 4%
2013 2 5% 1 5% 4 7% 1 4%
2014 4 9% 0 0% 6 10% 0 0%
2015 2 5% 0 0% 2 3% 0 0%
44 88% 20 100% 58 100% 23 100%
Table 3 (continued)
Lose FPI status Gain FPI status
Ownership sample Full sample
Lose FPI status Gain FPI status
Variable Mean Median Std Dev Mean Median Std Dev Mean Median Std Dev Mean Median Std Dev
Panel D: Descriptive statistics
ΔFPI Score 4.0 4.0 1.6 -4.4 -4.5 1.5 4.1 4.0 1.5 -4.5 -5.0 1.6
ΔFinancial Statements 1.7 2.0 1.3 -2.1 -2.0 1.0 1.7 2.0 1.2 -2.1 -2.0 1.0
ΔDisclosure of Insider Information 0.8 1.0 0.7 -0.6 -0.5 0.7 0.8 1.0 0.7 -0.7 -1.0 0.8
ΔCorporate Governance 1.5 2.0 0.8 -1.7 -2.0 0.5 1.6 2.0 0.7 -1.6 -2.0 0.5
Total Assets 1,104.4 98.5 2,800.0 52.1 16.9 145.3 1,133.5 83.9 2,940.5 66.3 16.9 141.4
(The table is continued on the next page.)
Gain FPI status (N=23)
Full sample
Lose FPI status (N=44) Gain FPI status (N=20)
Ownership sample
Lose FPI status (N=50)
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TABLE 3 (continued)
Notes: The table provides descriptive statistics about the foreign domicile, U.S. stock exchange listing, announcement year of the change in FPI status, and firm 
characteristics. FPI Score is the number of requirements from Table 1 (excluding the two requirements related to initial registration with the SEC) that a firm 
complies with before and after the change in FPI status. FPI Score is the number of requirements from Table 1 (excluding the two requirements related to initial 
registration with the SEC) that a firm complies with calculated both before and after the change in FPI status. ΔFPI Score  is FPI Score after the change in FPI 
status less FPI Score before the change in FPI status. Financial Statements relates to the timeliness, quality, and quantity of information disclosed in financial 
statements. It is calculated as the number of the following five requirements that a firm complies with: Accelerated Filing, U.S. GAAP, Segment Disclosure,  
Auditor’s Attestation on Internal Controls, and Quarterly Filings. Disclosure of Insider Information relates to information on insiders ownership and sales as 
well as selective disclosure of material inside information. This is calculated as the number of the following two requirements that a firm complies with: 
Disclosure of Insider Ownership and Sales and Regulation FD. Corporate Governance is calculated as the number of the following two requirements that a firm 
complies with: Proxy Rules and U.S. Stock Exchange Corporate Governance. ΔFinancial Statements , ΔDisclosure of Insider Information , and ΔCorporate 
Governance is the value of Financial Statements , Disclosure of Insider Information , and Corporate Governance , respectively, after the change in FPI status 
less the value before the change in FPI status. Total Assets  is total assets of the firm and is measured in the year prior to changing FPI status. 
  
Stock market reaction to firms' announcement of a change in FPI status.
N Mean Median N Mean Median
Ownership sample 44 2.30% *** 2.61% ** 20 -1.79% -0.78%
(0.010) ( 0.013) (0.298) (0.498)
Full sample 58 1.53% * 1.28% * 23 -2.17% -1.07%
( 0.087) ( 0.096) (0.176) (0.297)
Firms that lose FPI status
CAR
Notes: The table reports the market reaction to firms' announcement of losing (gaining) FPI status and 
initiating (ceasing) U.S. domestic reporting. The ownership sample consists of firms that lost (gained) 
FPI status due to U.S. residents' ownership of a firm's shares outstanding increasing (decreasing) above 
(below) 50%. CAR  is the cumulative abnormal return from one trading day before the announcement of 
the loss of FPI status to one trading day after the announcement where abnormal returns are estimated as 
the difference between the firm's return and its expected return using the market model. *, **, and *** 
represent statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels based on two-tailed t-tests for the mean 
and Wilcoxon signed-rank tests for the median (p-values in parenthesis). 
Table 4
Firms that gain FPI status
CAR
 
  
Table 5
Variable CAR   CAR   CAR   
Panel A: Ownership sample
Intercept -0.010 0.000 -0.091
(0.495) (0.999) (0.247)
ΔFinancial Statements -0.013 ** -0.014 * -0.019
(0.045) (0.065) (0.357)
ΔDisclosure of Insider Information 0.003 -0.017 0.042
(0.762) (0.195) (0.107)
ΔCorporate Governance 0.022 ** 0.024 * -0.025
(0.016) (0.057) (0.545)
Size 0.004 0.005 0.008
(0.286) (0.277) (0.315)
N 64 44 20
Adjusted R
2
0.14 0.14 0.05
(The table is continued on the next page.)
Firms that lose and 
gain FPI status
Firms that lose FPI 
status
Regression of cumulative abnormal return on the categories of the change in FPI Score.
Firms that gain   
FPI status 
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Table 5 (continued)
Variable CAR   CAR   CAR   
Panel B: Full sample
Intercept -0.003 0.041 -0.050
(0.849) (0.312) (0.436)
ΔFinancial Statements -0.007 -0.010 -0.023
(0.261) (0.206) (0.152)
ΔDisclosure of Insider Information 0.008 -0.009 0.045
(0.442) (0.504) (0.040)
ΔCorporate Governance 0.015 ** 0.005 0.001
(0.041) (0.716) (0.987)
Size 0.000 -0.002 0.006
(0.922) (0.618) (0.365)
N 81 58 23
Adjusted R
2
0.03 0.02 0.11
Notes: The table reports the ordinary least squares regression of the market reaction to firms' announcement 
of losing (gaining) FPI status and initiating (ceasing) U.S. domestic reporting on the change in reporting 
requirements. The ownership sample consists of firms that lost (gained) FPI status due to U.S. residents' 
ownership of a firm's shares outstanding increasing (decreasing) above (below) 50%. FPI Score is the 
number of requirements from Table 1 (excluding the two requirements related to initial registration with the 
SEC) that a firm complies with before and after the change in FPI status. CAR  is the cumulative abnormal 
return from one trading day before the announcement of the loss of FPI status to one trading day after the 
announcement where abnormal returns are estimated as the difference between the firm's return and its 
expected return using the market model. Financial Statements relates to the timeliness, quality, and quantity 
of information disclosed in financial statements. It is calculated as the number of the following five 
requirements that a firm complies with: Accelerated Filing, U.S. GAAP, Segment Disclosure,  Auditor’s 
Attestation on Internal Controls, and Quarterly Filings. Disclosure of Insider Information relates to 
information on insiders ownership and sales as well as selective disclosure of material inside information. 
This is calculated as the number of the following two requirements that a firm complies with: Disclosure of 
Insider Ownership and Sales and Regulation FD. Corporate Governance is calculated as the number of the 
following two requirements that a firm complies with: Proxy Rules and U.S. Stock Exchange Corporate 
Governance. Δ for the above variables is calculated as the value of each variable after the change in FPI 
status less the value before the change in FPI status. Size  is the log of total assets in the year prior to the 
change in FPI status. *, **, and *** represent statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels based on 
robust standard errors (two-tailed p-values in parenthesis). 
Firms that lose and 
gain FPI status
Firms that lose FPI 
status
Firms that gain   
FPI status 
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Table 6
Monte Carlo simulation of stock market reaction to change in FPI status.
Variable β E[β] β E[β] β E[β]
Panel A: Ownership sample
ΔFinancial Statements -0.013 0.001 -0.014 0.001 -0.019 -0.006
ΔDisclosure of Insider Information 0.003 0.000 -0.017 0.004 0.042 -0.027
ΔCorporate Governance 0.022 -0.001 0.024 -0.001 -0.025 -0.007
Size 0.004 -0.001 0.000 -0.001 0.008 0.001
N
Variable β E[β] β E[β] β E[β]
Panel B: Full sample
ΔFinancial Statements -0.007 0.001 -0.010 0.000 -0.023 0.012
ΔDisclosure of Insider Information 0.008 0.007 -0.009 0.004 0.045 0.014
ΔCorporate Governance 0.015 -0.002 0.005 0.000 0.001 -0.008
Size 0.000 -0.002 -0.002 -0.001 0.006 -0.005
N
Notes: The table reports the Monte Carlo analysis simulating the expected cross-sectional variation in event returns under the null hypothesis. The 
analysis is performed using the full sample and ownership sample, the latter of which consists of firms that lost (gained) FPI status due to U.S. residents' 
ownership of a firm's shares outstanding increasing (decreasing) above (below) 50%. The simulation is as follows. First, we estimate coefficients from a 
regression of cumulative abnormal returns on the categories of the change in FPI Score  (ΔFinancial Statements , ΔDisclosure of Insider Information , 
and ΔCorporate Governance ), where FPI Score  is the number of requirements from Table 1 (excluding the two requirements related to initial 
registration with the SEC) that a firm complies with before and after the change in FPI status. Second, we randomly select one non-announcement day 
for each firm from the year preceding the announcement date of firms' change in FPI status and regress the three-day cumulative abnormal return 
centered on the randomly chosen non-announcement day on the categories of the change in FPI score. Third, we repeat the second step one thousand 
times retaining coefficient estimates for each iteration. Last, we test whether the estimated coefficients for the event days ( β ) are statistically 
significantly different from the average of the one thousand estimated coefficients for the non-announcement days (E[β] ) using the empirical 
distribution of β on non-announcement days to compute the standard error of E[β]. p-values (two-tailed) for the test β =E[β]  are in brackets. CAR is the 
cumulative abnormal return from one trading day before the announcement of the loss of FPI status to one trading day after the announcement where 
abnormal returns are estimated as the difference between the firm's return and its expected return using the market model. Financial Statements relates 
to the timeliness, quality, and quantity of information disclosed in financial statements. It is calculated as the number of the following five requirements 
that a firm complies with: Quarterly Filings, Accelerated Filing, Auditor’s Attestation on Internal Controls, U.S. GAAP, and Segment Disclosure. 
Disclosure of Insider Information relates to information on insiders ownership and sales as well as selective disclosure of material inside information. 
This is calculated as the number of the following two requirements that a firm complies with: Disclosure of Insider Ownership and Sales and Regulation 
FD. Corporate Governance is calculated as the number of the following two requirements that a firm complies with: Proxy Rules and U.S. Stock 
Exchange Corporate Governance. Δ for the above variables is calculated as the value of each variable after the change in FPI status less the value before 
the change in FPI status. Size is the log of total assets in the year prior to the change in FPI status. *, **, and *** represent statistical significance at the 
10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
81 58
[0.637]
20
Firms that lose FPI status
CAR
      [0.218]      
[0.421]
      [0.876]      
Firms that lose FPI status
CAR
      [0.760]      
[0.382]
      [0.769]      
[0.340]
23
[0.923] [0.268]
      [0.000]***       [0.089]*    
[0.723] [0.851]
Firms that lose FPI status
CAR CAR
      [0.078]*          [0.297]      
Firms that lose and gain     
FPI status Firms that lose FPI status
CAR
      [0.065]*    
[0.350]
      [0.088]*    
44
[0.921]
      [0.000]***
[0.467]
64
CAR
      [0.000]***
[0.869]
Firms that lose and gain     
FPI status
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Table 7
Variable CAR   CAR   
Intercept -0.048 -0.003
(0.149) (0.930)
ΔAccelerated Filing -0.025 -0.032 *
(0.168) (0.089)
ΔU.S. GAAP 0.021 0.002
(0.246) (0.906)
ΔSegment Disclosure -0.029 * -0.014
(0.091) (0.450)
ΔAuditor's Attestation on Internal Controls 0.016 0.041 *
(0.400) (0.051)
ΔQuarterly Filings -0.013 -0.017
(0.527) (0.460)
ΔDisclosure of Share Ownership and Sales -0.033 ** -0.027 *
(0.033) (0.085)
ΔRegulation FD 0.005 -0.012
(0.788) (0.526)
ΔProxy Rules 0.012 -0.006
(0.550) (0.772)
ΔU.S. Stock Exchange Corporate Governance 0.064 *** 0.058 **
(0.005) (0.023)
Size 0.006 -0.001
(0.138) (0.282)
N 64 81
Adjusted R
2
0.22 0.07
Notes: The table reports the ordinary least squares regression of the market reaction to firms' announcement of losing (gaining) FPI 
status and initiating (ceasing) U.S. domestic reporting on the change in reporting requirements. The ownership sample consists of firms 
that lost (gained) FPI status due to U.S. residents' ownership of a firm's shares outstanding increasing (decreasing) above (below) 50%. 
CAR  is the cumulative abnormal return from one trading day before the announcement of the loss of FPI status to one trading day after 
the announcement where abnormal returns are estimated as the difference between the firm's return and its expected return using the 
market model. Accelerated Filing  is equal to 1 if the firm is an accelerated filer, and 0 otherwise. U.S. GAAP  is equal to 1 if the firm 
reports using U.S. GAAP, and 0 otherwise. Segment Disclosure  is equal to 1 if the firm discloses segment data, and 0 otherwise. 
Auditor’s Attestation on Internal Controls  is equal to 1 if the firm's auditor attests on internal controls, and 0 otherwise. Quarterly 
Filings  if the firm files quarterly financial statements, and 0 otherwise. Disclosure of Insider Ownership and Sales  if the firm 
discloses insider ownership and sales consistent with U.S. requirements, and 0 otherwise. Regulation FD  is equal to 1 if the firm is not 
permitted to make selective disclosures, and 0 otherwise. Proxy Rules  if the firm files proxy information, and 0 otherwise. U.S. Stock 
Exchange Corporate Governance  is equal to 1 if the firm does not opt out of any of the U.S. stock exchange corporate governance 
requirements, and 0 otherwise. Δ for the above variables is calculated as the value of each variable after the change in FPI status less 
the value before the change in FPI status. Size  is the log of total assets in the year prior to the change in FPI status. *, **, and *** 
represent statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels based on robust standard errors (two-tailed p-values in parenthesis). 
Regression of cumulative abnormal return on the changes in the individual FPI exemptions.
Ownership sample Full sample
